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Abstract
Some researchers have suggested that correlation information and 
information  about  action  are  bound  in  a  single  representation: 
“causal  knowledge”.  If  children  have  only  observed  correlation 
information, do they spontaneously try to generate the effect?  Do 
they represent the relationship as potentially causal?  We present 
three action and looking-time studies that suggest that even when 
toddlers  (mean;  24  months)  predict  that  one  event  will  follow 
another, they neither initiate the first event to try to generate the 
second (as preschoolers, mean 47 months, do spontaneously), nor 
do they expect that the predictive relations will involve physical 
contact.  Toddlers  succeed  at  both  of  these  inferences  when  the 
events  are  described using causal  language.   This  suggests  that 
causal  language  plays  a  role  in  helping  children  recognize  the 
relationship between prediction, action, and contact causality.
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No action from association 
Classical conditioning and operant learning are two ways in 
which  animals  learn  relationships  in  the  environment. 
However,  animals  do  not  naturally  bind  these  kinds  of 
information together: Pavlov’s dog may learn to drool at the 
sound  of  a  bell  in  anticipation  of  dinner,  but  will  not 
spontaneously ring the bell to bring dinner (e.g., Gopnik & 
Schulz, 2004; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Blaisdell, 2008). In 
contrast, when adult humans observe correlated events, we 
can represent  the events as potentially causally connected 
and can successfully intervene to determine whether or not 
one event is a direct cause of the other. This suggests that 
for  adults,  correlation  information  and  information  about 
action  are  bound  in  a  single  representation:  “causal 
knowledge”.  We  do  not  know  however,  to  what  extent 
infants  and  young  children  can  move  from prediction  to 
action, nor to what extent children infer that physical events 
that predict one another may involve spatial contact.
Researchers have long speculated about the relationship 
between correlation information and causal knowledge, and 
in particular, about the relationship between prediction and 
action. Philosophers have suggested that only a cognitively 
sophisticated  being  would  recognize  “that  the  very  same 
relationship  that  he  exploits  in  intervening  also  can  be 
present both when other agents intervene and in nature even 
when  no  other  agents  are  involved”  (Woodward,  2004). 
Similarly,  psychologists  have  suggested  that  causal 
knowledge requires understanding causal relations as stable 
relations among diverse events,  not merely relations “that 
involve rewards or punishments (as in classical or operant 
conditioning),  and  not  just  events  that  immediately  result 
from (one’s) own actions (as in operant conditioning or trial-
and-error learning)” (Gopnik et al., 2004).  The implication 
is  that  human  beings  may  be  unique  among  animals  in 
having  the  single  representation  (causal  knowledge)  that 
encodes  the  potential  commonality  between  non-agentive 
covariation  in  the  world  and  covariation  between  agent 
actions and outcomes.
In  our  first  experiment,  we  look  at  whether  older  and 
younger children can use a predictive relationship between 
two events  to  initiate  the  target  action  and  anticipate  the 
outcome of their own action.  In the second experiment, we 
test the hypothesis that causal language might help children 
recognize the relevance of predictive relations to their own 
interventions.   In  the  third  experiment,  we  eliminate  the 
action measure and use a violation of expectation paradigm 
(manipulating the presence or absence of contact causality) 
to assess whether toddlers simply have difficulty bridging 
the gap  between prediction  and  action  or  whether,  in  the 
absence  of  causal  language,  they  also  fail  to  expect  that 
predictive relations respect principles of contact causality.
Experiment 1: From prediction to action
We introduce children to several trials of a novel event: all 
children  see  a  block  contact  a  base,  after  which  a  toy 
connected to the base lights up and spins.  Following these 
observations, we ask whether children predicatively look to 
the  toy  when  the  block  touches  the  base,  and  whether 
children (spontaneously or with prompting) touch the block 
to the base and then look to the toy.  Our primary question is 
whether  children  use  the  evidence  from  the  observation 
trials  to  infer  that  their  action  might  generate  the  target 
outcome. Note that simply performing the action might not 
mean  that  the  child  expects  the  action  to  generate  the 
outcome. To ensure that the child acts with the expectation 
that  the  outcome  might  result,  we  coded  children’s 
predicative looks to the toy after performing the action. 
Methods
Participants.  Sixteen preschoolers  (m=47mos; rng:  37-60 
mos) and 14 toddlers  (m=24 mos; rng:  19-30  mos) were 
recruited from a large metropolitan science museum.
Materials.  A large stage blocked a confederate from view. 
A purple block was attached to a concealed lever which slid 
across a slit in the stage, creating a track for the block, and 
leading to a second block (base) which remained fixed to 
the left of the stage. An orange wire attached the base to a 
toy airplane in the stage’s upper left corner.   The airplane 
was controlled by a button on the back of the airplane which 
could  be  surreptitiously  activated  by  the  confederate  and 
which caused the toy to spin and light up.  
Procedure. All children were tested individually in a quiet 
corner  of  the  museum.  There  were  three  phases:  an 
Observation Phase, an Action Phase, and (for those children 
who failed to intervene spontaneously) a Prompted Action 
Phase.  (See  Figure  1.)  Throughout  the  experiment,  the 
experimenter looked at the child so that the child would not 
follow the experimenter’s eye gaze to the toy.    
Observation Phase: At the beginning of the experiment, 
the  experimenter  elicited  the  child’s  attention  by  saying, 
“Watch  my  show!”  The  confederate,  who  was  concealed 
behind the apparatus, slid the block towards the base, so that 
from the child’s perspective the block appeared to move on 
its own.  When the block contacted the base, the confederate 
immediately activated the airplane for 3 seconds.  As soon 
as the block moved away from the base, the plane slowed to 
a stop. Pilot work confirmed that this provided a compelling 
causal  illusion:  adults  believed  that  contact  between  the 
block and the base activated the plane.
This activation sequence was repeated four times.  On the 
fifth trial (the Predictive look trial), the block contacted the 
base, but  the confederate did not  activate the plane.   The 
experimenter observed the child to see if the child looked 
predicatively  up  to  the  plane.   If  the  child  failed,  the 
experimenter  added  a  sixth  trial  in  which  the  plane 
activated, followed by a seventh trial in which it did not.  If 
the  child  again  failed  to  look  predicatively  towards  the 
plane, they were excluded from the analyses.  If the child 
looked predicatively towards the toy (on either trial five or 
seven),  the  experimenter  concluded  with  a  final  trial  in 
which the block contacted the base and the plane activated.  
Action Phase: The experimenter  slid  the block  towards 
the child, pointed to the plane and said, “Okay now it’s your 
turn. Can you make it go?”  Children were given 60 seconds 
to play freely. At no point was the plane activated for the 
child.  If the child performed the target action during the 60 
seconds  of  free  play,  the  experiment  ended;  if  the  child 
failed to touch the block to the base during the 60 seconds, 
she or he moved onto the Prompted Action Phase.
Prompted Action Phase: The experimenter slid the block 
almost all the way into the base, stopping just short of the 
base and returned it to the child saying, “It’s your turn.” The 
child was given another 60 seconds to perform the target 
action.  If the child failed to perform the complete action 
following the prompt, they were excluded from analyses.  
Results & Discussion of Experiment 1
Two  preschoolers  and  three  toddlers  were  excluded  and 
replaced for failing to make the initial predictive look.  An 
additional  three  toddlers  were  excluded  and  replaced  for 
failing to  perform the  action  during the  Prompted Action 
phase.  The stringent inclusion criteria meant that we could 
be confident that all the children in the subsequent analyses 
had  both  learned  the  predictive  association  between  the 
block and the toy and were able to perform the target action. 
Intercoder agreement was 100%.  
    We coded success on the task generously: children who 
predicatively looked to the toy after performing the action, 
regardless  of  whether  they  performed  the  action 
spontaneously or with prompting, were counted as passing 
the task.  Children were coded as failing only if they never 
predicatively looked to the toy after performing the action.
While  almost  all  preschoolers  succeeded  at  the  task 
(87.5%), none of the 14 toddlers did.   That is, although the 
toddlers  played  freely  with  the  block  during  the  Action 
Phase, no toddler performed the target action spontaneously, 
and none predicatively looked to the toy after  performing 
the prompted action.  The preschoolers were significantly 
more likely to succeed at the task than the toddlers (χ2 = 
23.0, p < .0001) and were also significantly more likely to 
generate  the  action  spontaneously  (and  anticipate  the 
outcome) (χ2 = 13.1, p < .001).  (See Table 1.)
The striking discrepancy between the performance of the 
younger  and  older  children  suggests  that  only  the  older 
children  believed  the  evidence  of  the  Observation  Phase 
indicated a possible causal  relationship between the block 
and the toy1. Though all toddlers both predicted the outcome 
of  the  observed  action  and  performed  the  target  action 
(under  prompting),  they  did  not  show  any  indication  of 
understanding that their own actions might activate the toy. 
Experiment 2: Causal Language 
In Experiment 2, we investigate the possibility that causal 
language  might  help  toddlers  represent  the  predictive 
relation  as  a  potentially  causal  relation.   There  are  two 
accounts  by  which  causal  language  might  support  young 
children’s  causal  reasoning.  One  possibility  is  that  non-
human animals (and arguably very young children) have at 
least  two  distinct  systems  for  reasoning  about  correlated 
events:  one  for  processing  statistical  associations  among 
events  in  the  world  (as  in  classical  conditioning),  and 
another  for  processing associations  between agent  actions 
and  outcomes  (as  in  operant  conditioning,  trial  and  error 
learning,  and  imitative  learning;  Gopnik  et  al.,  2004; 
Gopnik  &  Schulz,  2004;  Woodward,  2004;  Tomasello  & 
Call, 1997). An intriguing proposal is that in any domain of 
knowledge  where  component  abilities  are  ontogenetically 
early  and  phylogenetically  broad,  language  may  play  a 
critical role in uniting otherwise separate inferential systems 
(e.g. Spelke,  2003). Because two core component abilities 
of  causal  inference—learning  statistical  associations 
between events and learning the relationship between one’s 
own  actions  and  their  immediate  outcomes—are  present 
both  in  early  infancy  and  in  non-human  animals,  it  is 
tempting  to  suggest  that  linguistic  representations  might 
support  the  integration  of  these  component  systems  into 
adult-like causal reasoning. 
1 Toddlers  might  have  been  confused  or  frightened  by  the 
spontaneously moving block (i.e., because it violates core object 
principles; Spelke, 1990), however, their willingness to play freely 
with the block during the Action Phase and their success in the 
subsequent experiments argues against this construal.
If so, it is possible that even during the course of a short 
task, hearing the same words used to describe both events 
might    help   children   bind   together   information   about 
Figure 1: Method and Results for Experiments 1 and 2.
predictive  relations  and  information  about  action. 
Describing the observed correlation (“The block makes the 
toy go”) with the same verb as the invitation to act (“Can 
you  make the toy go?”) might help children recognize the 
relevance  of  observational  evidence  to  their  own 
interventions.  That  is,  children  may  infer  that  the  same 
words are used because they refer to the same underlying 
concept. Eventually children might thus come to recognize 
the possibility of causal relations among a broad range of 
non-agentive  physical  events  (including  cases  where  no 
verbal description of events is provided).
A weaker version of how language could affect children’s 
causal representations might suggest that children do form 
common  representations  of  agentive  and  non-agentive 
correlations but fail to use predictive information as a basis 
for  action  if  they  have  no  additional  reason  (beyond the 
covariation evidence itself)  to assume events  are causally 
related. Many researchers have suggested that neither adults 
nor children draw causal inferences merely from covariation 
information  (Ahn,  Kalish,  Medin,  &  Gelman,  1995; 
Koslowski,  1996;  Shultz,  1982).   In  the  absence  of  any 
knowledge about the causal mechanism that might underlie 
the  observed relationship,  children  might  realize  that  one 
event predicts another but fail  to conclude that  the events 
are causally related.  If so, children would have no basis for 
action.  Under this interpretation, the tendency to represent 
correlated  events  as  viable  candidates  for  intervention 
depends upon prior knowledge of a plausible mechanism 
Action:
Success
(Predictive Look)
Failure
(No Predictive Look)
Spontaneous Prompted Spontaneous Prompted
Exp. 1: 4’s 10 4 0 2
Exp. 1: 2’s    0 0 0 14
Exp. 2: ICL    7 1 5 3
Exp. 2: ECL    9 1 0 6
Exp. 2: 
Control    1 0 5 10
Table 1: Results of Experiment 1 & 2 by action type and success.
linking the events.  In this case, causal language (by which 
we  mean  here  language  familiar  to  toddlers:  “make  go”, 
“turn on”) might facilitate causal learning by testifying that 
an  observed  relation  is  indeed  causal.   That  is,  children 
might  treat  events  as  causal  (i.e.,  as  supporting 
manipulation)  simply  because  they  are  told  that  they  are 
causal  (that  the  block,  rather  than  for  instance,  some 
unobserved common cause, does indeed make the toy go).
Although  these  accounts  are  theoretically  distinct,  they 
make a common prediction with respect to this experiment: 
if language facilitates young children’s ability to move from 
prediction  to  action  –  either  by  helping  toddlers  bind 
together  correlational  information  with  representations  of 
their own actions, and/or because 24-month-olds can rapidly 
learn  novel  causal  relations  from  testimony  –  then 
describing the events of the Observation Phase using causal 
language might improve children’s performance. 
If  so, we can then ask whether the facilitating effect of 
causal  language is  fragile  and depends on using  precisely 
the same words (“The block makes it go”; “Can you make it 
go?”)  or  whether  language  acts  as  a  fairly  robust  cue  to 
children’s causal learning and non-identical but semantically 
equivalent  words suffice (“The block makes it  go”;  “Can 
you turn it on?”).   However, if language merely improves 
children’s performance by increasing their attention to the 
events, then, relative to Experiment 1, toddlers’ performance 
should  also  improve  in  a  non-causal  language  control 
condition  where  language  is  used  merely  to  attract 
children’s attention (“Look at my block!  Let’s watch my 
show!  Here it goes!”).  
Methods
Participants Forty-eight toddlers were assigned to each of 
three conditions; the  Identical Causal Language Condition 
(ICL) (m=24.5mos; rng: 19-29mos), the Equivalent Causal 
Language Condition (ECL) (m=23.6mos; rng: 18-30 mos), 
and the Non-Causal Language Control Condition (Control) 
(m=23.6mos; rng: 18-30mos).  
Materials  &  Procedure. The  same  materials  used  in 
Experiments  1  and  2  were  used.  The  procedure  was 
identical  to the procedure  in Experiment  1 except for the 
previously noted language changes, (See Figure 1). 
Results & Discussion of Experiment 2
Coding and inclusion criteria  were as  with Experiment 1. 
Intercoder agreement was high across all conditions (ICL: 
92%;  ECL:  97%;  Control:  98%).  Three  toddlers  were 
excluded  and  replaced:  1  for  failing  to  make  the  initial 
predictive look and 2 for failing to perform the target action.
Children in the Control condition replicated the failure of 
toddlers in Experiment 1;  only 1 of  the 16 toddlers  (6%) 
succeeded at  the task,  intervening spontaneously and then 
looking predictively.  Control children were no more likely 
to succeed on the task and no more likely to generate the 
action spontaneously (and anticipate the outcome) than the 
toddlers in Experiment 1 (χ2 = .905, p = NS). 
However,  the pattern of results  reversed for  children in 
the  Identical  Causal  Language  (ICL)  condition  and  the 
Equivalent Causal Language (ECL) condition.  Eight of the 
16 toddlers (50%) in the ICL condition succeeded at the task 
and 10 of the 16 toddlers (62%) in ECL condition succeeded 
at the task.    In both ICL and ECL conditions, the toddlers 
were significantly more likely to succeed on the task than 
the toddlers in Experiment 1 (ICL: χ2  =9.55,  p<.01);  ECL: 
χ2=13.1,  p<.001)  and  more  likely  than  toddlers  in  the 
Control condition (ICL: χ2  = 7.58,  p<.01);  ECL: χ2=11.2, p 
< .001).  The toddlers were also significantly more likely to 
generate  the  action  spontaneously  (and  anticipate  the 
outcome) than were the toddlers in Experiment 1 (ICL: χ2 = 
8.00,  p<.01);  ECL: χ2=11.2,  p<.001), and also more likely 
than the toddlers in the  Control condition (ICL: χ2  = 6.0,  p 
=  .01);  ECL:χ2=9.3,  p<.01).  There  were  no  differences 
between  the  ICL and  ECL conditions  on  either  of  these 
measures (Overall  Success: χ2  = .508,  p=NS;  Spontaneous 
action success: χ2=.50,  p=NS), and no differences between 
the ECL condition and the preschoolers from Experiment 1 
(Overall  Success:  χ2=2.67 ,  p=NS;  Spontaneous  action 
success: χ2=0.13,  p=NS). Additionally, toddlers in the  ICL 
condition  were  just  as  likely  to  generate  the  action 
spontaneously (and anticipate the outcome) as preschoolers 
in Experiment 1 (χ2=1.13, p = NS), but were less likely than 
preschoolers to succeed overall (χ2 =2.67, p =.02). (Table 1).
These results suggest that describing observed events with 
causal language supports children’s ability to recognize that 
non-agentive  events  support  manipulation.   Toddlers  who 
were given causal language cues were just as successful as 
the four-year-olds in Experiment 1.  The effect of language 
was relatively robust, surviving minor changes in wording 
as long as the meaning was preserved. Critically, the effect 
of language is not entirely general; merely calling children’s 
attention to events did not improve their performance.  
Language in Representation and Processing
We proposed that causal language could improve children’s 
performance either by helping children providing a common 
representation for predictive looking events and children’s 
own actions,  or  by testifying that  an observed relation  is 
genuinely causal. However, the results of Experiments 1 and 
2 are also consistent with a more deflationary account: the 
toddlers’ failure  might  be  one  not  of  competence  but  of 
performance.  Myriad  developmental  studies  suggest  that 
children’s apparent understanding of a concept depends on 
whether the dependent measure involves looking or acting 
(e.g. Hood, Cole-Davies, & Dias, 2003; Ahmed & Ruffman, 
1998).  Such  results  have  led  some researchers  to  suggest 
that  intentional  action  might,  in  general,  lag  behind 
predictive looking: either because the demands of planning 
and  executing  motor  responses  interfere  with  children’s 
ability to access task-relevant information (Baillargeon et al, 
1990; Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Thelen & Smith, 
1994), or because stronger representations are necessary for 
acting than  for  looking (see Munakata,  2001 for  review). 
Although  there  are  important  theoretical  distinctions 
between these two claims, they are united in suggesting that 
a  gap  between  children’s  ability  to  make  successful 
predictions  and  their  ability  to  perform  effective  actions 
might reflect changes in children’s ability to manifest their 
knowledge under complex task demands.   These accounts 
assume that difficulties in moving from prediction to action 
are  due  primarily  to  competing  information  processing 
demands.  If so, any information (such as causal language) 
that strengthens the representation of a causal  relationship 
might  make  it  more  likely  to  withstand  the  demands  of 
planning and executing a motor act. 
   One  way  to  look  at  whether  causal  language  merely 
facilitates  children’s  ability  to  move  from  prediction  to 
action,  or  whether  causal  language  genuinely  changes 
children’s underlying representations is to use a dependent 
measure  of  children’s  causal  understanding  that  does  not 
involve action.  It has long been suggested that infants and 
children  expect  physical  causal  events  to  involve  contact 
between the agent and patient. While this has primarily been 
demonstrated  with  respect  to  motion  events  (Leslie  & 
Keeble,  1987;  Oakes  &  Cohen,  1990),  recent  research 
suggests that children also assume that agent-initiated events 
resulting in an object’s change of state (e.g., a hand moving 
towards a box and the box breaking, or making music) also 
require contact (Muentener, in review; Kushnir & Gopnik, 
2007)2.  If toddlers require causal language to represent the 
predictive relationship between the block and the plane as 
causal, then in the absence of causal language, they should 
make no predictions about whether or not the block contacts 
the base;  in  the presence of causal  language,  they should 
assume the block contacted the base when the toy is on and 
did not contact the base when the toy is off. 
 
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we use a violation of expectation paradigm 
to  test  whether  children  infer  contact  causality  from 
predictive relations. Using the same stage as in Experiments 
2 Critically, infants only seem to expect contact when the change 
of state is initiated by an agent (e.g.,  a human hand); consistent 
with our findings here, if the event is initiated by another object, 
the infants have no expectations about contact causality.  
1 and 2, we slide the block behind an occluder that partially 
covers the base.  On a final trial, we remove the occluder to 
reveal the block in contact or not in contact with the base. 
If language helps children form a ‘causal representation’ 
of  the  events,  then  in  the  absence  of  causal  language, 
children might  fail  to  form a causal  representation of  the 
events (consistent with the results of Experiments 1 and 2) 
and  should  thus  show  no  looking-time  differences.   By 
contrast, when causal language is used, children should look 
longer at the no contact case than the contact case when the 
plane activates but show the reverse pattern when the plane 
fails  to  activate.  However  if  the  processing  account  is 
correct  and  toddlers’  failures  in  Experiment  1  and  the 
Control condition  of  Experiment  2  are  due  only  to  the 
difficulty  involved  in  initiating  motor  responses,  then 
children should expect the block to contact the base when 
the toy activates even in the absence of causal language.
Methods
Participants Seventy-two toddlers were randomly assigned 
to one of six conditions (m = 23mos;  rng: 18-30mos).  
 
Materials  &  Procedure.  Materials  were  identical  to 
Experiments 1 and 2 with two exceptions: a blue box was 
used to occlude the track during the familiarization trials; a 
larger board occluded the whole stage between trials.
Children  were  assigned  to  the  Language  Control  
condition,  the  Causal  Language Toy  On condition  or  the 
Causal Language Toy Off  condition.  Within each of these 
conditions, half the children were assigned to the Contact 
outcome  and  half  to  the  No-contact  outcome.  The 
experimenter first pointed out the elements of the stage to 
the  child  (the  occluder,  block,  base,  and  airplane),  then 
placed the occluder in front of the track so that the base was 
visible, but so the trajectory of the block was hidden.  
During the Observation phase, the block slid toward the 
base, behind the occluder, and appeared to move on its own. 
On  half  the  trials,  following  the  block’s  movement,  the 
plane activated,  and on half it did not activate. Children’s 
looks to the plane were coded on the non-active trials, and 
only children who predictively looked on at least one trial 
were included in analyses. After each trial, the whole stage 
was occluded by the board and the stage reset  (the plane 
stopped,  the  block  slid  back).   At  the  start  of  each  trial, 
children in the  Language Control  were told “Look at this! 
Watch  the  block!”  and  children  in  the  Causal  Language 
conditions were told, “Look! The block can make it go!” 
For the test trial, the procedure was repeated.  Once the 
block moved behind the occluder, the plane activated in the 
Language Control and Causal Language Toy On conditions; 
it did not activate in the Causal Language Toy Off condition. 
The  experimenter  then  removed  the  occluder  revealing 
either the Contact or No Contact  outcome and waved her 
hand  non-specifically  toward  the  stage  saying,  “Look  at 
this!” to elicit the child’s attention.  The child’s looking time 
was monitored through the camera to avoid influencing the 
child’s  attention.  The  trial  ended  when  the  child  looked 
away from the stage for 2 consecutive seconds.
Results & Discussion of Experiment 3
Two  toddlers  were  excluded  and  replaced  for  failing  to 
make a predictive look during the Observation phase. We 
coded how long children looked at the stage following the 
Figure 2: Looking results for Experiment 3 revealing no difference 
in  looking  between  Contact  and  No  Contact  outcomes  when 
children do not receive causal language, but showing children in 
the  Causal Language Toy On condition  looking significantly less 
following the Contact trial (Mean = 7.10) than children in the No-
contact  trial  (Mean =  19.16)  (t(22)  =  -4.15,  p  <  .001),  and  a 
reverse  of  this  pattern  of  looking  for  children  in  the  Causal  
Language Toy Off  condition (Contact Mean = 12.44; No Contact 
Mean = 5.25; t(22) = 2.58, p < .01).
removal  of  the  occluder  on  the  test  trial.  Intercoder 
agreement was high (96%).
In the  Language Control  condition children were just as 
likely to look following the Contact test trial (Mean=18.98s) 
as children who observed the No-contract test trial (Mean = 
17.61s) (t(22)=0.24,  p = NS).  We ran a two-way analysis of 
variance for independent samples on children in the Causal 
Language conditions, with activation (toy on or off) as the 
first  between  subjects  variable  and  block-to-base 
relationship  (Contact,  No  Contact)  as  the  second. 
Comparisons between conditions revealed an effect of toy 
activation (averaging across Contact/No Contact outcomes, 
children looked less overall when the toy did not activate (F 
= 4.31, p = .04)), but there was no main effect of block-to-
base outcome (averaging across the two conditions by toy’s 
activation, children who saw the Contact outcome looked as 
long  as  children  who  saw  the  No  Contact  outcome). 
Importantly, comparisons revealed a significant interaction: 
children  in  Causal  Language  conditions  spent  less  time 
looking at the stage when the evidence was consistent with 
contact causality than when it was inconsistent (F(1, 47) = 
21.79, p < .0001). (See Figure 2).
When the toy activated but no causal language was used, 
children looked equally long at the stage whether the block 
was in contact with the base or not.  This suggests that even 
when  toddlers  are  freed  from the  necessity  of  making  a 
motor response, they fail to form a causal representation of 
these events.  By contrast, children in the Causal Language 
condition  showed  the  predicted  pattern  of  differential 
looking;  toddlers  seemed  to  expect  the  block  to  make 
contact with the base when the toy activated and to fail to 
make contact when the toy did not.  This suggests that in the 
presence of causal language, children assume not only that 
predictive  relations  support  intervention,  but  also  that  the 
events  respect  the  principles  of  contact  causality.  These 
results  are  consistent  with  the  Representation  account, 
suggesting that  language helps  children form a genuinely 
causal representation of the events.  
Conclusions
Despite  having  no  difficulty  learning  the  predictive 
relationship  between  events  and  performing  the  relevant 
action,  toddlers  succeeded  at  moving  directly  from 
prediction  to  action  only  when the  observed  events  were 
described  with  causal  language.  Similarly,  toddlers 
succeeded  at  moving  from  prediction  to  expectations 
consistent with contact causality only when the predictive 
relations were described with causal language. 
As noted, our results are consistent with both a stronger 
and a weaker form of the representational change account. 
The  stronger  version  suggests  a  genuine  discontinuity 
between  linguistically  unsophisticated  toddlers  and  older 
children  (and  potentially  a  similar  discontinuity  between 
adult human and non-human animals). Initially, infants and 
toddlers might recognize predictive relations, the ability to 
support  intervention,  and  physical  contact  relations  as 
independent features of  events,  but  not  have access to  an 
adult-like  concept  of  causality,  (which  entails  all  three). 
Providing a common term for relations with these features 
might help children develop an integrated representation. 
The weaker account suggests that children have the same 
concept of causality as adults but expand their repertoire of 
what ‘counts’ as evidence for a causal relation.  Infants, for 
instance,  might  treat  only  agent-initiated  action  and 
Michottean events as ‘causal’ and only gradually (aided by 
adult testimony) include a broader range of events. 
Although  these  accounts  are  theoretically  distinct,  the 
distinction may diminish to the extent that young children’s 
initial understanding of causality is constrained.  We find it 
striking,  for  instance,  that  although  the  setup  provided  a 
compelling causal illusion to both adults and preschoolers, 
and even toddlers readily learned the predictive relationship, 
toddlers in Experiment 1 never once attempted to bang the 
block into the base, despite being prompted to “make the toy 
go” and having just seen the block repeatedly strike the base 
and the toy activate.  If children initially only recognize a 
very  limited  set  of  relations  as  potentially  causal,  then 
learning more about particular  causal  relations may affect 
their  representation  of  causality  in  general.   Future  work 
might investigate the extent to which very young children 
engage  in  such  joint  inferences  (see  e.g.,  Kemp  & 
Tenenbaum,  2008;  Schulz,  Goodman,  Tenenbaum  & 
Jenkins, 2008 for related work). The present study, however, 
suggests that even during the course of our short task, causal 
language helps two-year-olds perform better than Pavlov’s 
dog, by helping them integrate information about prediction, 
intervention, and contact causality. 
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